Egocentric nature of moral judgments – Professor Bogdan Wojciszke

Judgments of moral character lay at the core of person- and self-perceptions, people make them incessantly and with great ease. People also widely and strongly believe in the objective nature of their moral judgment. However, the dual-process account of information processing posits that moral judgments are a joint product of two processes – automatic, affect-laden intuitions and controlled, rational decisions. Because the former are fast and continuously active, they may be expected to play a greater role than the latter, which are slower and active only in welcoming conditions. In effect, judgments of moral character should be prone to egocentric biases of the kind “what is good for me is generally good” (i.e. moral). Professor Wojciszke presents a series of studies showing that others’ dishonest behavior is evaluated leniently (up to positive), when the observer profits from this dishonesty. Actors bringing profits are liked by the observer and the increased liking of such actors completely mediates the increases in their moral evaluations. Observers truly believe in their biased moral judgments (and trust in the cheater who brings profits) and they are not aware that their moral judgments are biased by their interests (they believe that their judgments follow moral norms, Więcej…

Oryginalny wpis: Egocentric nature of moral judgments – Professor Bogdan Wojciszke